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Abstract
Narrating is a human instinct—by narrations, the past 
exposes itself to us, enabling a communication that would 
not have been possible in the temporal and geographical 
distanciation, as well as generating an “I” that understand 
the others as a part of oneself and oneself as a extension 
of others. From this perspective, translation is, to some 
extents, narrating, but of more cultural significance. 
This essay serves as an inquiry into the border between 
narrative and translation, expounding the primary 
form “mimesis” by which human experience is made 
meaningful and which gives the shape and meanings 
to human life. Mimesis crystallizes the link between 
translation and historical truth, linguistic hospitality 
and cultural co-existence and this essay explores the 
link from the vantage points of Paul Ricoeur’s narrative 
theorizing on the importance of narrative as the 
expression of  experience, mode of communication, and 
path to understanding the world and ultimately ourselves. 
Presenting a variety of perspectives from narratology 
and translation studies, the essay hopes to discourse the 
intricacies narratives and translation process, highlights 
how translation imitates the original writings, events and 
forms of lives and represent them into new narratives. 
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1. PAUL RICOEUR AND HIS NARRATIVE 
THEORIZING 
When Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) died in his sleep 
in his flat just outside Paris, at the age of 92, people 
lament the last survivor of the “mighty generation”of 
French philosophers, including Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-1961) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), 
who were all born before the WWI. Among one of the 
“most challenging, hospitable and enduring thinkers 
of the twentieth century” (Kearney, 2006:x), Ricoeur 
published over 30 work in his lifetime covering not 
only all the prevailing philosophical theories from 
existentialism and phenomenology but also subjects 
one could hardly associate with his research domain, 
such as psychoanalysis, politics and even religion, 
which, according to many, had undermined his academic 
reputation (Andrew, 2000, p.45)1. 
Nevertheless, the translation of his major volumes 
makes the pendulum swing the other way: his work 
are succinctly published and reprinted in the UK and 
US, his philosophical detour from Aristotle (384 BC-
322 BC) to Matin Heidegger (1889-1976) starts to be 
appreciated and words become constantly quoted for 
disentangling public controversies and awaking social 
conscientious (Buchanan, 1967; Kohak, 1991; Pellauer, 
1  For his steady interest in religion, Ricoeur endures lifetime 
contempt from his prestigious peers who cautiously keep religion 
out of their concerns. Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Jacque 
Lacan refuse to take him seriously or to engage in any dialogue 
he invites. Their massive influence in the continent turns students 
away from Ricoeur’s work in total. Some commentators even mock 
Ricoeur for being a “throwback philosopher” born in the wrong age 
and one who “addressing an audience of graying parishioners”. 
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2000; & Pellauer, 2007)2. Interestingly yet ironically, in a 
striking similar way, Ricoeur’s modesty and doggedness, 
like the long-route he takes in philosophy, have to take a 
long suffering path3 before they could be acknowledged 
in his own nation where “ostentation and flair are often 
prized”(Macel, Ricoeur, Jolin et al., 1973, p.4).
No philosopher needs justify an interest for either time 
or narrative, with the former measures human existence and 
later increasingly unequivocal to be the covert structure we 
capture the relationship with the world (Fludernik, 1988, 
p.3). But for Ricoeur, this interest becomes an abiding 
enchantment. Chasing a shadowy instinct on “semantic 
innovation” surfaced when he was conceiving The Rule of 
Metaphor4, Ricoeur eventually spent almost four years on 
this three-volume magnum opus in which he intensively 
yet not exclusively schemas his conception on narrative, 
starting from the confrontation he stages between time and 
narrative, to narrative in literature and finally to narrative 
identity. As if he were not well-expressed, one year later 
he rippled the narrative scholarship again with his Oneself 
as Another, steering his reflective philosophy further into 
recess of narrative and understanding.
It would be inappropriate if we would not consult 
Gerard Genette given his now classic  Narrative 
Discourse, in which three different kinds of narrative are 
distinguished: first and foremost--“recit”, which is now 
generally translated as “narrative”, and defined as “the 
oral or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event 
or a series of events.” (Genette, 1980, p.26) Generally 
according with the Russian formalists’ distinction 
of “plots” or “sjuzet”, the definition loosely follows 
Aristotle’s definition of plot as “an imitation of actions”; 
secondly, “histoire”, or “story,” which is defined as the 
“succession of events”, which accords with the formalists’ 
“fibula”, and implies that events themselves, rather than 
the way they are told, comprise the story and are a kind 
2  Among the most referred books dealing with social injustice 
are The symbol of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1967; Freedom and Nature: the Voluntary and 
the Involuntary, trans. Erazim Kohak, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1991; The Just, trans, David Pellauer, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000 and Reflection on Just, Trans. 
David Pellauer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, to 
name only a few.
3  Compared with Heidegger’s “Dasein”, which “cuts the short” 
on the ontological quest by making “Being” accessible to all 
human existence and suggests its indelibility lies within its own 
possibilities. Ricoeur, on the contrary, painstakingly and also quite 
proudly undertakes a “long-route” in tracking the meaning of 
“Being”. He holds that “Being” could only be understood through 
mediation and the meaning of “Being” is continuously subject to 
interpretations. 
4  Ricoeur’s initiation on creating Time and Narrative is no more 
than to form a complementary pair with his work on metaphor, since 
both metaphor and narrative is “productive invention”. Nevertheless, 
the results transcend what is designed to be and Time and Narrative 
became not only an parallel work to The Rule of Metaphor, but also 
an independent hermeneutic expedition that inspires and entrenches 
Oneself as Another.
of content of the narrative. Then, Genette introduces a 
third term, “narration”, (translated as “narrating”), which 
he defines as “the act of narrating taken in itself” (ibid, 
1980, p.26). Among the three-layered taxonomy, “recit” 
is the signifier of the narrative text; the “histoire” then 
aligns with the signified of the narrative, and “narrating” 
produces narrative action and, by extension, the whole of 
the real or fictional situation in which that action takes 
place” (ibid, 1980, p.27).
Corresponding to Genette, Ricoeur also defines 
“narrative” or “plot” as an imitation of events (Bialostosky, 
1982, 21-30)5. However, Ricoeur demonstrates little 
intention, if any, on dissecting and classifying narratives: 
for Ricoeur, to narrate indeed involves the fields of 
language and action—telling and stories—yet the 
significances of narrative lie in his reconceptualization 
of narratives as “the recounting human experiences” 
(Ricoeur, 1984, p.6). He thus attributes epistemological 
and ontological values to narrative, arguing that a human 
experience is “already riddled with stories in a way that 
suggests a demand for narrative immanent to experience 
itself” (Ricoeur, 1984, p.x) (which is found echoing with 
psychoanalysts who claim that we might think of lives in 
terms of untold or virtual stories). Therefore, narratives 
for Ricoeur purport first and foremost, recounting or 
articulating a life, rather than imposing them on an 
alien content. Henceforth, we would attempt to diverge 
from Genette’s limited focus on the concept of plot and 
extend our definition, as Ricoeur did, to encompass both 
categories of “recit” and narration.
2 .  R I C O E U R ’ S  H E R M E N E U T I C A L 
INTERPRETATION OF “MIMESIS”
Ricoeur’s exposition on narratives, drawing upon his 
earlier work on metaphor and myth, is too complex for 
a brief recapitulation here. His crucial point, however, 
is narrative’s rule as linguistically mediated temporal 
synthesis. His elaboration on narrative—consisting mainly 
of the three-volume Time and Narrative, is well-marked 
with hermeneutic orientation. Ricoeur admits frankly that: 
“Whether it be a question of metaphor or plot, to explain 
more is to understand better” (Ricoeur, 1984, p.17). That 
explains the reason why in Time and Narrative, Volume 
I., Ricoeur starts with the perplexity of the pervasiveness 
of time: indeed, we have to concede that “time” does not 
only matter on the intuition level since all experiences are 
in time, but also on the fact that time constitutes one of the 
central problems of philosophy and profoundly influences 
how we think of identity, meaning, existence and self. 
5  Don Bialostosky (1953-), from a Bakhtinian perspective, criticizes 
Genette and Ricoeur for following Aristotole’s definition but 
ignoring the question of imitation of speech or voice, as in lyric. 
Bialostosky therefore pits Plato’s mimesis against Aristotle’s and 
finds it superior, since it encompasses the world of speech.
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Henceforth what Ricoeur determines to undertake, is 
explaining self, identity, meaning and existence through 
the lubrication of narratives. That’s why the first volume 
of the book does not only serve as a philosophical 
retrospection of time, in spite of Ricoeur’s determination 
in taking up the challenge of singling out the persistently 
difficulty of phenomenological and cosmological time6. 
Ricoeur’s ambition is far beyond that: after his patient 
unknotting of the “aporia of time” and the lengthy 
analysis on how compatible Aristotle’s “mimesis” is to 
human action, Ricoeur saves his hermeneutic tradition at 
his ending point, stating that “time becomes human time 
to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a 
narrative”(Ricoeur, 1984, p.3). 
If, we are allowed to run along Ricouer’s rationale, we 
may find that “to interpret” never fades from Ricoeur’s 
view, as he says “…the world unfolded by every narrative 
work is always a temporal world and narrative, in turn, 
is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features 
of temporal experience” (Ricouer, 1984, p.5). Thus, time 
is the antecedent to narrative, not merely because any 
narrative discourse demands temporal engagement, but 
the nature of narrative requires events be arranged in 
some way and the establishment of causal relationships. 
We may have every reason to conclude that, for Ricoeur, 
to understand time we have to understand narrative since 
it is the “guardian of time”, and the appreciation of our 
lives, our own selves and our own places in the world 
could only be obtained by interpreting lives “as if they 
were narratives”, or more precisely, through the work of 
interpreting our lives we “turn them into narratives, and 
life understood as narrative constitutes self-understanding” 
(Simms, 2003, p.81).
Therefore, a hermeneutic circle of time and narrative is 
forged since the temporal experience is indicated through 
narratives, while social reality reflected in narratives 
for they are the tracks of temporal experience. And this 
circularity is mediated by three senses of representation: 
mimesis1, mimesis2, mimesis3. (Simms, 2003, p.81)
3. TRANSLATION AS MIMESIS
Mimesis1, or prefiguration, as Ricoeur puts it, describes 
the basic pre-understanding of temporality which is an 
antecedent to imitation and representing human action. It 
configures our pre-understanding on linguistic structure 
6  Aristotle’s understanding of time indicates that time is “the 
number of movement with respect of the “before” and “after”. For 
him time is a cosmological existence that could not be stretched 
or tempered by human. However, Augustine’s perplexity about 
time is more reflective, which implies that time is “distention of 
the soul”. The dispute was never settled, if not heated by Kant’s 
neglecting of phenomenological experience, Husserl’s inefficiency 
in reconstituting object time and Heidegger’s short-slightness on 
the fact that even his “world time” may have to submit to each 
individual “Dasein”. 
(how to use words and arrange them in an acceptable 
sequence), symbolic characters (the context in which 
we describe, recount human actions) and temporality of 
action (the pre-narrative structure of temporal experience 
makes narrative markers of the passing time) and thus 
presents the cognitive and practical backdrop of mimesis2. 
Then mimesis2, or configuration, articulates the pre-
understanding structures, symbols into stories by picking 
up and integrating events into an intelligent whole. 
Finally, mimesis3, or refiguration, refers to how the act 
of reading changes our post-understanding of the world. 
Through the three-fold mimesis, Ricoeur establishes his 
hermeneutic circle and invites us to see it as a spiral: 
each time us narrative, we are turning the circle through 
prefiguration, configuration and refiguration and thereby 
the hermeneutical task of reaching human understanding 
attains ever greater height.
3.1 Translation Representing the “Prenarrative” 
Discourse —Mimesis1 
If we may expend our reading a little further to Ricoeur’s 
juvenilia work, we could find that, for him, language 
exists primarily because there is first “something to say”; 
because we have an experience to bring into language—as 
he put it: “if language were not fundamentally referential, 
would or could it be meaningful?” (Ricoeur, 1979, p.19) 
If so, then conversely, once language become utterance, 
or writing, it would definitely be narrative and once 
be purged of every figurative and decorative element, 
language would return to its original vocation—the 
vocation, according to Ricoeur, to “convey the knowledge 
of events” (Ricoeur, 1979, p.20). 
Hence the pre-narrative feature of language is too 
clear to be overlooked, and as a direct inference, language 
is no longer directed towards ideal meanings, as it has 
been sought by translators of generations, but refers 
to the experience that pillared by narrative discourses. 
Therefore we may come to two conclusions: firstly, 
suppose the “original vocation” of language is per se to 
“convey events”, then the “meaning” in language would 
accordingly lies not in symbols, but in “events”; secondly, 
if so, to speak is already to “narrate” and any text may 
therefore be written narrative discourses. These two 
inferences are of great significance since the former might 
shift the prevailing concern over meaning rendering in 
translation studies and later spontaneously draws narrative 
to translation studies given the fact that to translate/
interpret is to re-narrate the narratives. Subsequently, 
translation has been firmly planted in the narrative soil 
and grants the mimesis hypothesis spacious room to 
flourish. All of these suggest the feasibility as well as the 
potential productivity of inletting narrative theories into 
translation studies: not merely for the revivification of 
translation studies, neither the vindication for narrative 
theories’ interdisciplinary competence, but for the 
revelation of how translation is intrinsically yet implicitly 
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related to narrative. Fortunately, Ricoeur’s hypothesis 
is at hands to heal aploria and the solution hinges upon 
Ricoeur’s central assumption—mimesis.
3.2 Translation as Configuration of Narratives— 
Mimesis2
 From the probe of the pre-narrative outline to the 
configuration of events and plots, we may have to 
experience two steps: “eventalization” and “employment”, 
which would receive thorough expounding respectively. 
“Eventualization”—the precipitation of events in 
narratives. Supposing, as Ricoeur put it, the original 
vocation of language is to “convey the knowledge 
of events” (Ricoeur, 1984, p.12), and translators do 
manage to perceive the beckons of agents, motives and 
circumstances, how could we transmit these inkling 
outlines into intelligible event? “Eventalization” means 
the rediscovery of the “connections, encounters, supports, 
blockages, plays of forces, strategies that implied in the 
pre-narrative text”; in this sense, it means to provide 
elements that may make visible a singularity out of 
numerous possibilities (ibid, 1984, p.17). It focuses 
on preserving characters and actions and surfaces the 
meaning through conjuring pre-existent events, which 
makes it differentiate from neither Michel Foucault 
(1926-1984) or Annales school of French historians, since 
the former coins the term to show that history is only a 
random selection and things weren’t necessary as all that 
and the later refers it to a new meaning creation process, 
which tends to be something as highly resolved as the rise 
or fall of grain prices, rather than the colorful narrative 
drama with which we are familiar.
The notion of “eventalization” itself contains a number 
of elements. First, it indicates that translation should treat 
all objects of knowledge as potential events containing 
characters, actions and motives; Second, it works by 
constructing around the singular event analyzed as process 
a “polygon” or rather a “polyhedron” of intelligibility. And 
one has to bear in mind that the further one decomposes 
the processes under analysis, the more one is enabled, 
and indeed obliged to construct their external relations 
of intelligibility (Foucault, 1987, p.104); Third,the 
“eventualization” process does not conjure meanings; it 
only presents events that wait to be integrated into “plots”.
For Ricoeur, it is “plot” that “unifies the elements 
of a story including the reasons, motives, and actions 
of characters with events, accidents, and circumstances 
together into a coherent unity” (Ricoeur, 1984, p.9). It 
“synthesizes, integrates and schematizes actions, events 
and ultimately, time into a unified whole that says 
something new and different than the sum of its parts.” 
(Kaplan, 2003, p.50) Ricoeur’s focus on plot may stem 
from its organizational function: in a story, the prime 
organizer of event is the plot. The plot gives completeness 
and wholeness to action by providing a measure of 
explanation. Events are arranged in such a fashion (a 
beginning, middle and an end) as to explain the import 
of those events. The plot provides coherence. Ricoeur 
observes that the organizational effect of the plot pertains 
to the discussion of time as discordant. The plot addresses 
the discordance of time through the arrangement of action 
into a manageable and meaningful whole. 
Comparably, in translation, facing strings of events, 
accidents and motives, we need to synthesize, integrate 
and schematize actions, events and ultimately, time into 
a “unified whole that says something new and different 
than the sum of its parts” (Kaplan, 2003, p.50), to achieve 
intelligibility out of heterogeneous, to integrate multiple 
events into unified human experience. And they strategy 
we need is what Ricoeur calls “emplotment”, which 
is broadly defined as a “synthesis of heterogeneous 
elements” (Ricoeur, 1984, p.33), and which makes 
completeness out of multiple incidents.
We should bear in mind that, when assume translation 
as configuration of narratives, we have little inclination 
to indicate that translation would faithfully represent 
every piece of events contained in languages; in fact, 
neither transition could and would not function as a mimic 
window pane nor mimesis would be confined to such a 
stagnant interpretation: Ricoeur sees mimesis a “creative 
process of selection, translation, and transformation from 
one media to another” (Ricoeur, 1984, p.33) and by saying 
“translation as mimesis”, we intend to arrive at something 
more than serial or successive enumeration, but a creative, 
individual representation. Therefore translation gains now 
approaches that differentiating itself fundamentally from 
the previous attempts.
3.3 Reading Translated Work as Narrative—
Mimesis3
Despite Ricoeur’s contribution to the understanding of 
the mimesis1 and mimesis2, the picture is still incomplete. 
The sequence provided by employment is certainly 
an important part of an effective narrative, yet it is 
questionable whether the experience of narration could 
be adequately captured by attending primarily to a 
story’s plot. The consonance of narration is more than its 
sequence. When we read or hear a story, the linear order of 
the plot’s beginning, middle and end is not the only thing 
we experience. Indeed more often than not it is not simply 
the “emplotment” of a story which captures and holds our 
attention. We experience not only the tale, the telling, but 
understanding as well. The essence of narrative, in this 
sense, is that it is understood; that is to say, the audience 
is called upon to imagine, in their own mind as if they are 
narrating to themselves, by a kind of projection, a definite 
person or personality experiencing the twist and turns of 
the plot.
And the mimesis3 serves exactly the purpose: it is 
defined, according to Ricoeur, as the act of reading that 
links the world of the work with the world of the reader. It 
completes the passage from prefiguration to configuration 
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through refiguration. The prenarrative features of 
language, imitated in narrative through translation, is then 
unfolded in the act of reading, itself an action that imitates 
a narrative. As reading completes the hermeneutic circle of 
prefiguration, configuration and refiguration, translation 
is also fulfilled with the reception with understanding as 
its ideal result. The act of reading performs the critical 
function of bridging the world of the text with the world 
of the reading and thus inaugurates the reconfiguration of 
life by translation.
In that case, to produce “good translation” would 
be nothing less than to tell a “good story”, which does 
more than just offer a configuration of time. Assuming 
translating is somehow paralleling to storytelling, and 
then consequently, it would be fully capable of awakening 
our affectivity and the values feelings intend that a 
reconfiguration of the self is effected, like a story.
Clearly this could be done in a variety of ways. Some 
translators would have the reader attend to the immediacy 
of experience, and others would have the reader enter the 
mind of them narrator. Regardless of the literary style, 
a good story facilitates an entry into the world of the 
text by evoking an effective response. We are moved by 
the text to consider the truth of the text. That movement 
could liberate our affectivity. When we fully experience 
our affectivity, the groundwork for achieving the values 
which some feelings intend is laid. At the level, a dynamic 
circularity between life, translation and narrative has 
been forged and translation hence obtains the power of 
clarifying and transforming life.
CONCLUSIONS
As well-illustrated in “textbooks” and “handbooks” 
of translation, “rendering meaning from one language 
into the other”, often, though by no means always, has 
been one of the central concerns for translation studies 
(Bassnett, 1988, pp.5, 13, 15-17; Mona, 1992, pp.3, 7-8, & 
23-25; Nida, 1983, pp.77-79; Nida & Taber, 1989, pp.120-
126; Gentzler, 2001, pp.11-14, 19, 22-26, 29, 64, 83, 121, 
153, 161, 165, 174, 179, & 201.), disregarding it takes 
the form of “equivalence” or “faithfulness”, be deemed as 
“art” or “science” or which side translators pick between a 
“creative artist” who “ensure the survival of writing across 
time and space” (Bassett, 1988, p.5) and a “manipulative 
rewriter” who engages in an inequality of power relations. 
Indeed, translation, in particular cross-cultural translation, 
primarily involves, and in any cases rightfully to be 
so, meaning rendering. Nevertheless mono-maniacally 
cornering translation—as Randolph puts—“one of the 
most difficult tasks that a writer can take upon” (Quirk, 
1974, p.ii) - to the narrow, one-way alley of “meaning 
transferring” is unmistakably zooming out the boundless 
indefinite possibility of translation and its unfathomable 
capability, which inevitably ties up translation and pins it 
down to “convey the message” or “explain the meaning”. 
If so, the nature of translation would miserably be no more 
than a pure laboring maneuver—porting messages back 
and forth between “interested parties”, and translation 
would thus become a dilettante pursuit accessible to 
anyone with adequate lexical knowledge of other language 
(s). 
Certainly, retrieving “meaning” from geographical and 
temporal remoteness in every way deserves translators’ 
attention, and in some cases, it might well determine the 
fulfillment of task; while when preoccupied by restoring 
“meanings”, we would narrow-mindedly spare no efforts 
to please either of the “two masters” or stuck in between 
and overlook the fact that translation is fundamentally a 
task undertook by human beings and serving all human 
kind. Therefore, the “meaning of translation” is far beyond 
“translating meanings”, or interpreting ideas, but to create 
a “sanctuary”, which unlike “museums” exhibiting extinct 
stuffed creatures and art work suffocating behind bullet-
proof shields, which bears no similarity with a “library” 
which people may pay regular visit but could never 
comfortably live in, and communication is “effectively” 
lessened by the public sign “Keep Quiet” lurking around 
every aisle. 
To create the “sanctuary”, translators need to embark 
on an intellectual adventure that prefigures the linguistic 
and ideological and cultural legacies within the language 
itself, configures clamor of voices through temporality 
and finally refrigerate them into mental pictures imprinted 
in the readers’ mind. It refers primordially and primarily 
to the unveiling (or restoration) of “events” and then 
integrate them into  “plots” or “stories”, historical and 
fictional alike, which preserve meaning as if meanings 
are attached to them and in which agents, goals, means, 
interactions, circumstances, unexpected results would 
be integrated into a intelligible completeness. If so, the 
skyline of translation studies would be changed for once 
and for well: Firstly, the acute tension over meaning 
(literal or liberal, translatability or untranslatability) 
could be successfully eased by altering the “meaning 
rendering” to “event recounting”, or to put it in a 
simple way, “stories telling” and thus implies infinite 
possibilities of amalgamation between translation 
studies and narrative theories. And only by so doing, to 
interpret, would veritable purport to render what is alien, 
foreign, or distant in terms of our historically inherited 
pre-understanding (Kaplan, 2003)7, not through racking 
our brain to pin down equivalences of any kinds or 
differentiating “false friends”, but via taking translation 
as a process of recounting historical or fictional events 
that once happened or were fabricated in cultural distance; 
and only by so doing, translation could be once again 
obtain its dynamics by evolving back to its original 
orbit and becomes stories that told of people, by people, 
7  It concurs with Ricoeur’s hermeneutic view point. For Ricoeur, to 
interpret literally means to render the alien, the foreign.
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for people. These “recounted” stories would no longer 
point to a destined ending, target a designated audience; 
instead, they would beckon cultures of all origins, and be 
submitted to various individual interpretations. 
If we are allowed to take translation as a prefiguration-
configuration-refiguration process, forming a hermeneutic 
circle unifies authors, translators and readers. Translation 
imitates the prenarrative reality of language, ensuing that 
the author’s proposition of a fictional or historical world 
is maintained and agents alive; translation imitates the 
plot by creatively integrate events into stories, unfolding 
the meanings that subject to individual interpreting; 
translation imitates the readers’ own narratives, ensuring 
the narratives’ continuity in the other dimension. Unlike 
any trend in translation studies, through “mimesis” 
translation would for the first time threads authors, 
translators and readers together, rather than drives them 
to hostile camps and value them equivocally in the 
translation decision making process. 
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